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One of the most destructive wars of the colonial period, King Philip’s War was
named for the nominal leader of the native coalition that fought against the
colonists in Massachusetts proper in the mid-1670s. Metacom (dubbed Philip
by the English) was a Wampanoag sachem. Maine Historical Society Collec-
tions. 
CREATING AN INDIAN ENEMY IN THE
BORDERLANDS: KING PHILIP’S WAR 
IN MAINE, 1675-1678
BY CHRISTOPHER J. BILODEAU
In the borderlands space between New England and Québec, the Wa-
banaki Indians had their own reasons for getting embroiled in a conflict
that started in southern New England, King Philip’s War (1675-1678).
This essay argues that, ironically, the English vision of a monolithic In-
dian enemy was the key to Wabanaki success in this war. The Wabanakis
were a heterogeneous group when it came to the issue of fighting the
English, with many eager to join the fight, others ambivalent, and still
others against. The English of Massachusetts Bay and Maine, however,
treated the entire Wabanaki population as united under a central au-
thority, and they retaliated against any Wabanaki depredations as if all
Wabanakis were geared for war. This blanket attitude toward the Indi-
ans, held by many Englishmen from Maine, New Hampshire, and Mas-
sachusetts Bay, would be self-fulfilling. By assuming all of the Wabanakis
were armed for war, English leaders, soldiers, and settlers minimized
overtures of peace, fell susceptible to rumor, and retaliated with violence
against most of the Indians they encountered. By treating them all as
hostile, the English gradually alienated so many different groups of Indi-
ans in Maine that they encouraged even the most pacific Wabanakis to
join the war. However, that homogenization of the Indian enemy did not
lead to the centralization of Indian warriors, as the Wabanakis re-
mained decentralized. Because the Wabanakis had no central army, they
did not make a central target, and such diffusion would be critical to
their victory in the Maine borderlands. The author is an assistant profes-
sor of History at Dickinson College. He researches the history of Ameri-
can Indian-European interaction during the colonial period in the
northeastern borderlands.
KING PHILIP’S WAR has been called the most destructive warfought between Indians and Englishmen during the colonial pe-riod.1 Led nominally by the Wampanoag sachem Metacom, or
“King Philip,” the Nipmucks, Narragansetts, and Wampanoags, all Algo-
nquian-speaking Indians of southern New England, made a series of
devastating attacks against Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, and Rhode Is-
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land colonies.2 Angry about English encroachment onto their lands by
settlers and Protestant missionaries, these Indian groups asserted their
sovereignty against what they believed were unjustifiable pressures. Be-
tween one and five percent of the total English population of the area
was killed.3 The war cost the English over £150,000 in damaged prop-
erty, and £100,000 for their defense—an enormous burden under which
these colonial governments suffered for years. As for the Indians, Philip
was killed in August 1676, and through casualties, the massive move-
ment of refugees, and enslavement, the Indian presence in southern New
England fell from one-fourth of the overall population to one-tenth.
From that point onward, the English maintained a political stranglehold
over the area.4
Accordingly, this significant event has attracted much scholarly at-
tention in the last couple of decades, and its importance to the develop-
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King Philip’s War was costly in terms of both lives and money. The native popu-
lation in southern New England declined rapidly as a result of the war. King
Philip was killed in August 1676, as pictured here. Maine Historical Society Col-
lections. 
ment of seventeenth-century New England cannot be gainsaid. For the
most part, however, scholars have ignored the conflict between the Wa-
banaki Indians and the English settlers in northern New England, view-
ing it as an adjunct to the famous conflict to the south.5 But the war in
Maine, which occurred between 1675 and 1678, deserves attention in its
own right.6 Only loosely connected with the devastation to the south,
the war in Maine presents a curious example of the dynamics of violent
conflict between northeastern Algonquian Indians and European
colonists. The Wabanakis won an astounding victory, pushing English
settlers and traders almost entirely out of the province. They killed 260
English men, women, and children out of a population of 3,500, and de-
stroyed nine out of the thirteen settlements.7 By war’s end, the Wa-
banakis had not suffered a fraction of the pain and dislocation that af-
fected the Indians of southern New England, as the Narragansetts,
Nipmucks, and Wampanoags experienced disaster at all levels of their
societies.8 King Philip’s War in Maine was an unprecedented victory for
the Wabanakis and an unmitigated disaster for the English.
Central to understanding this war in Maine is grasping Indian social
and political organization and its importance for Indian warfare. As
Wayne E. Lee, Kenneth M. Morrison, and other commentators have
noted, many Indian societies, in the Northeast and otherwise, lacked (in
Lee’s words) the “coercive political structure” necessary to force their
warriors to fight in large-scale warfare along European lines. Accord-
ingly, Algonquian warfare was only minimally centralized.9 During King
Philip’s War in Maine, different Wabanaki groups fought, or did not
fight, against the English for a wide variety of reasons and different
groups and individuals within Wabanaki villages ignored the words and
even pleas of their sachems for either war or peace.
Ironically, it was the English vision of a monolithic Indian enemy
that was key to the success of Maine’s Wabanakis in this war. The English
of Massachusetts Bay and Maine retaliated against Wabanaki depreda-
tions as if all Wabanakis were subject to a central authority, that all Wa-
banakis were geared for war. This blanket attitude toward the Indians,
held by many (not all, but many) Englishmen from Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and Massachusetts Bay, would be self-fulfilling. As historian
Wayne Lee argues, “Europeans…had notions of retaliation [that] were
much more thoroughly lethal. The European ideology of revenge pre-
sumed that an original violation of norms, however ‘small,’ authorized a
no-holds-barred retaliation.”10 By assuming all of the Wabanakis were
armed for war, English leaders, soldiers, and settlers minimized over-
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tures of peace, fell susceptible to rumor, and retaliated with violence
against most of the Indians they encountered. Many Englishmen, set on
crushing the Indians to the north, gradually alienated so many different
groups of Indians in Maine and New Hampshire by treating them all as
hostile that they encouraged even the most pacific Wabanakis to join the
war.
But that homogenization of the Indian enemy did not lead to the
centralization of Indian warriors. The Wabanakis did not fight in con-
cert, remaining true to their vision of power within their societies. And
that decentralization was crucial to their success. The English could not
contend with a dispersed enemy who attacked in small parties at differ-
ent times and places along the Maine coast. Because the Wabanakis had
no central army, they did not make a central target, and such diffusion
would be critical to their victory in the Maine borderlands.11
The two fronts of the war—northern and southern New England—
were only tenuously linked. The northeastern borderlands consisted of
the space that is now northern and central New Hampshire, Maine, and
southern Québec, between the English settlements of New England and
the French settlements of New France and inhabited exclusively by the
various Wabanaki tribes. The Wabanakis in this region had their own
reasons for fighting the English of Massachusetts Bay, independent of
what southern New England Indians were doing, although it is uncertain
if fighting would have occurred in the north without the problems to the
south.12 Clearly there was ample friction between some Wabanakis and
English colonists, but that friction did not characterize relations between
all Wabanaki groups and English colonists. For at least fifty years, both
groups had maintained relations of economic expediency, with periodic
clashes that led to small, individual cases of violence. Throughout the
seventeenth century the Anglo-Indian fur trade in Maine was character-
ized by intense competition. That was certainly the case around the
mouths of the Kennebec and the Androscoggin rivers, known during the
period as Sagadahoc. Interior traders competed with those who pa-
trolled the coast, or “coasters,” trading from their fishing boats from the
1620s up to the 1670s. At times, the fur trade became so competitive that
some traders used unscrupulous means—such as cheating Indians of
their goods through the use of alcohol—to achieve the most profitable
ends. Those situations often led to Indian retaliations and small-scale vi-
olence.13
During the summer of 1675, a string of events pushed certain Wa-
banakis to outright violence on the Maine frontier. The first occurred
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during the summer of 1675, probably just after the outbreak of warfare
to the south, and involved the wife and child of the Saco sachem
Squando. According to the Ipswich minister William Hubbard, who
wrote the only contemporary work on the war in northern New Eng-
land, several English sailors abused Squando’s wife and infant child by
tipping over their canoe in an effort to test the rumor that all Indians
could swim from birth. The child sank and was rescued by his mother,
but died several days later. Squando, enraged by the death of his son and
the treatment of his wife, vowed not to let the act go unpunished, and he
convinced a number of Wabanakis of western Maine and eastern New
Hampshire (surely his fellow Sacos, but possibly some allied Pigwackets
and Androscoggins as well) to join him in harassing English settlements
along the northeastern frontier.14
Each side read this murder differently. Many Indians would have
found Squando’s desire for revenge justified. The Wabanakis and other
Algonquians fought wars for many different reasons, and the murder of
a sachem’s son would certainly demand retaliation.15 But Squando’s re-
action mystified many English colonists. They understood the child’s
death as a solitary act of murder, possibly accidental, and one that would
not justify violence against a whole group. In fact, many Englishmen be-
lieved that the Wabanakis had no justifiable reasons to go to war, and if
they did so they were vicious and gloried in senseless physical carnage.16
Hubbard echoed the opinion of these colonists when he declared that
the death of Squando’s child was “Some little Colour or Pretence of In-
jury,” and was too insignificant to cause the war, and “that this was only
an Occasion to vent the Mischief they formerly had conceived in their
Hearts.”17 But this “Pretence,” he and many like-minded colonists con-
cluded, was not due to any fault of English settlers in Maine. This view
probably predominated among the leadership of Massachusetts Bay,
who lumped together the natives of Maine and New Hampshire with the
newly hostile Wampanoags, Nipmucks, and Narragansetts. The English,
facing a crisis that threatened the lives of many, and possibly the exis-
tence of the colony, homogenized Indian motives and refused to recog-
nize nuances among Indian groups. That cultural misunderstanding
would be crucial to the exacerbation of tensions and the continuation of
violence on the Maine frontier.18
Other Wabanakis heard and responded to Squando’s pleas for re-
venge, but they had reasons of their own to fight the English, reasons
that arose almost simultaneously with the abuse of Squando’s family.
When King Philip’s War started in the south, messengers from the three
warring nations traveled to Indian villages across New England, includ-
ing the Wabanaki villages in Maine, to solicit help in ridding the area of
the English. Numerous Englishmen in New England, especially in
Maine, cited the pleas of the southern New England Indians as instru-
mental to Wabanaki involvement in a war that many, especially Ken-
nebecs and Penobscots, hesitated to join. When the war started in Sep-
tember 1675, Thomas Gardiner, a trader with Indians on the coast at
Pemaquid, wrote that “the first & Cheefest” reason for war was “the
Coming of divers Indianes from the westwards” who persuaded the Wa-
banakis to undertake “this ungodly Enterprise.”19 Gardiner, who had
traded often with Indians, especially the Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and
Penobscots, had come to trust many of them. He had built a good repu-
tation among the Indians on the frontier and would defend the Ken-
nebecs against overzealous Englishmen looking to attack any Indian,
friend or foe. In an effort to support and protect the local Indians he had
come to respect, Gardiner eventually blamed subsequent Indian attacks
on Falmouth (now Portland) not on local Wabanakis but on “stragling
persones” from the “southwards,” or the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and
Wampanoags from southern New England.20
But Gardiner understood the problems that plagued the Maine bor-
derlands in ways that colonial officials in Boston did not. He knew more
than most about the tensions that had dogged the Anglo-Wabanaki fur
trade, and he readily acknowledged that hostilities arose in part from
“our owne Acctings.”21 A particularly thorny problem stemmed from
English demands for Wabanaki guns. News of war in southern New
England (the first attacks were on June 24, 1675) arrived in Maine at
least by July 11, 1675, when Henry Sawyer of York sent word of it up the
Maine coast, and the magistrates in the region of Sagadahoc decided to
deploy a military contingent up the Kennebec River to demand that the
Wabanakis disarm. If the Indians refused to do so, the council of magis-
trates decided that the troops should attack immediately. Captains
Richard Patteshall and Thomas Lake (an important Indian trader on Ar-
rowsic Island) and a contingent of military volunteers soon met with a
group of coastal Androscoggin and Kennebec Wabanakis and asked
them to hand over their weapons. The English could only convince a
fraction of the small group of Indians present—seven Kennebecs and
five Androscoggins, from the area of the Pejepscot River—to give up
their arms, ammunition, powder, shot, and knives. Patteshall, Lake, and
a Mr. Wiswal suspected that some of the Indians still hid weapons, and
lobbied hard for the Indians to hand them over as well. Five more An-
droscoggins responded by bringing in their guns, but the tense scene
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Collectively called Wabanakis, the various bands of native peoples in Maine
have been referred to by the river along which they lived – thus, for example, the
Sacos, Androscroggins, or Penobscots. This 1605 map by Samuel de Champlain
depicts a native village at the mouth of the Saco River. Maine Historical Society
Collections.
soon turned violent, as an Androscoggin attacked a settler with an ax.
The settler survived unscathed, but the English were furious, and de-
manded the attacker’s execution. The Wabanakis eventually prevailed
upon the English to accept forty beaver skins as recompense for the at-
tack, to be paid after the next autumn’s hunt.22 The next day, the ancient
and respected Androscoggin sachem Rawandagon, whom the English
nicknamed Robin Hood, danced and sang in a display of peace, to the
approbation of all present. The trader Lake then dispersed rum, tobacco,
and other supplies to the Indians, although many English bystanders
were disgusted by what they believed was unearned generosity.23
But many Indians present were disgusted, too, especially a faction of
Androscoggins. Angered that the English would abuse Maine’s Indians
by demanding the Indians give up their weapons, humiliated that some
of their fellow Wabanakis would do so, and burning from what many In-
dians believed was years of abuse in the fur trade, these Androscoggins
found Squando’s message of raising the hatchet—for entirely different
reasons than Squando’s—more appealing than the soothing words and
dancing of their own sachem Robin Hood.24 The Kennebecs and many
other Androscoggins, however, steadfastly supported peace.
The hostile Indians waited until September 1675 to strike. At the be-
ginning of the month, a contingent of Indians, most likely the same dis-
affected Androscoggins from the parley, attacked the home of the trader
Thomas Purchase on the Pejepscot River, where they stole liquor and
ammunition and killed a calf and two sheep. Many English people along
the coast and in Massachusetts Bay, hearing about the attack, were in-
censed by what they believed to be Indian duplicity in the face of the re-
cent peaceful negotiations, not recognizing that the Indians might dis-
agree amongst themselves whether to pursue peace or war. The Indians
attacked a number of trading houses in the Sagadahoc region on Sep-
tember 9, when they molested two English ships filled with stores of
corn.25 But the next day, September 10, the violence started in earnest,
when Indians attacked the family of Thomas Wakely at their farm north
of Falmouth. Six were killed in a gruesome manner, and three others re-
mained missing.26
So, at this point, the Wabanakis harbored numerous opinions on the
war. Those in favor fought for at least four reasons. Many allied with the
sachem Squando were bent on revenge for the death of his infant son.
Others were incensed at English demands for Indian disarmament. Yet
others harbored resentment over decades-old problems related to the
fur trade. Finally, some listened attentively to envoys from King Philip,
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and wanted to engage the English in what might be understood as a pan-
Indian war on New England. And, of course, many Indians were moti-
vated by a combination of these issues. But other Indians remained un-
convinced. They pushed for peace, hoping to maintain trade for
necessities and skirt the inevitable problems that come from warfare—
death, disease, and migration from harm’s way. But when the war began,
English settlers and government officials elided these nuances and
viewed the Wabanakis as a monolithic group that wantonly violated an
agreement against violence. This disconnection between Indian motives
and English interpretations would profoundly affect how the war un-
folded.
More attacks happened in rapid succession after the incident at the
Wakely farm, attacks that highlight the complicated Indian-Indian and
Indian-English alliances that were beginning to form on the Maine fron-
tier. Thirty-six Saco warriors, led by Squando and goaded into war by
representatives of the warring nations to the south, moved down the
Saco River to attack the garrison-homes of Captain John Bonithon and
Major William Phillips, on either side of the river at the Saco township.
But a Saco Wabanaki named Scossaway and a group of pro-peace An-
droscoggins warned English settlers of Squando’s plan. Once Captain
Bonithon heard the news, he took his family across the river to Major
Phillips’ garrison, and had to watch his garrison and other buildings go
up in flames the next day.27 The Indians then attacked Phillip’s garrison,
but failed miserably in their assault, suffering six men dead and eighteen
wounded.28 They abandoned the siege, left the Saco River, and headed
northeast to Blue Point and Scarborough, where they killed several peo-
ple and destroyed at least twenty-seven homes. Along the way, they killed
five travelers.29 Overall, the mission failed, but the message was sent.
To the east, many Kennebecs heard of these attacks with alarm, but
not surprise. By this point they had already experienced tensions with
skittish English settlers and traders firsthand. Upon hearing about the
skirmish at Falmouth (but not yet of the killings at the Wakely farm), the
Kennebecs from the east side of the Kennebec River went to Captain
Lake’s trading post at Taconic (a point above on the Kennebec River,
now Winslow). Before any of the Indian depredations had occurred,
Captains Sylvanus Davis and Lake had decided to remove all of the shot,
powder, and other trade goods from the post and bring them down river,
closer to the coast, as they feared problems with the Indians. Lake then
sent a messenger to the Kennebecs, asking them to move down the river
and settle there, where they should not harbor any bad feelings toward
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the English, and where they could trade. The messenger then told the
Kennebecs that if they chose not to come down the river, and not to give
up all of their weapons, then, as Hubbard wrote, “the English would kill
them.” A situation that had demanded diplomacy and delicacy received
only ultimatums, and sending a messenger only highlighted the traders’
distrust. The Kennebecs must have been mystified and angered by this
message, as they had, up to this point, made efforts to maintain the
peace and encourage good relations. But they recognized immediately
that their lives were in danger, refused Lake’s offer, and immediately em-
barked eastward, toward the Penobscots, to confer with them about the
situation.30
The Kennebecs’ refusal to comply, coupled with the violence along
the southern coast, led to settler panic, then rage. Any sign of tension be-
tween the settlers and the Indians convinced many English colonists that
the Indians wanted war. The colonists at Pemaquid—the easternmost
English settlement on the coast—immediately abandoned the post and
fled to Damarascove and Monhegan Islands. On September 22, Thomas
Gardiner wrote to Governor John Leverett of Massachusetts Bay that the
people of Pemaquid “ar fled & Left their houses Corne Cattell & all to
the Ennimy (if Anny) & Cannot Expekt but the End will be A famin if
thay live.” They lacked the basic necessities, especially “Powder & shott
for their defence at the Iland.”31 Gardiner, a friend of many Indians in
the region, had already heard from some Wabanakis of the St. George’s
River area that most Indians had fled inland, fearing blanket reprisals by
the English. Gardiner wrote that English demands for Indian guns
forced the Indians to refuse the offer, as guns had become necessary for
their survival. “And seeing these Indianes in these parts did never Apeare
dissatisfied untill their Armes wear Taken Away,” Gardiner wrote, “I
doubt of such Acctions whether thay may not be forced to go the french
for Releife or fight Against us having nothing for their suport Almost in
these parts but their guns.” Both Gardiner and his fellow trader John
Earthy wanted to maintain peaceful relations with the local Wabanakis,
but the majority of English settlers who had fled to the coastal islands
“think fitt to go into the woods & Kill or sease on All Indianes thay find,”
which to Gardiner would “not only be frutles, but overbalanced with
Abundance of Danger.” What they really needed to do, Gardiner be-
lieved, was “get our selves into as defensive A posture as we Can.” These
new island refugees decided that an appropriate response to the situa-
tion was to put a £5 bounty on any Indian’s head, though none volun-
teered when asked to go on the march.32
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Although this separation of Indians and English settlers made for a
tense peace in eastern Maine, the attacks continued in western Maine. As
news of the raids began to trickle down the coast to the more populated
areas of southwestern Maine, coastal New Hampshire, and Massachu-
setts Bay, hostile Indians began to target Maine settlements. In October
1675, small groups of Sacos and Androscoggins attacked settlers at
Newechewannick (now the region of Berwick) and a house at Oyster
River in New Hampshire. Attacks then occurred at Kittery, Falmouth,
Black Point, and Wells in Maine, as well as Cocheco (Dover) and settle-
ments near Exeter and Hampton, in New Hampshire.33 In a fortunate
turn for the English, winter hit hard on October 16, and the Indians
were forced to retrench. The English attempted to coalesce a militia con-
tingent for winter raids against Indian villages at Pejebscot, Pigwacket,
and Ossippee in December, but by that time four feet of snow had fallen,
and the raids were called off.34 The Maine borderlands were quiet for the
time being.
That quiet opened the door for a potential peace during the follow-
ing spring and summer. Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire officials
gathered together with a group of Indians from western Maine, New
Hampshire, and northern Massachusetts Bay in Cocheco, New Hamp-
shire, to negotiate a peace, which was signed on July 3, 1676, by seven In-
dians, the most important being Squando. Dony, from the Kennebunk
Wabanakis of southeastern Maine, also signed—an indication that they
had joined Squando in fighting against the English as well. Representa-
tives of the Pennacooks, who had remained neutral, and the Christian
Indians of Wamesit, who had fought for the English, signed the treaty,
giving it more legitimacy. It stipulated that any who broke the treaty
would be prosecuted under English law as criminals, and that the Indi-
ans would give no aid to the southern New England Indians who were
still fighting the war.35
But peace did not characterize the deteriorating situation up the
coast, and one incident did much to drive many Indians away from the
English. When violence broke out on both the southern and northern
New England fronts in 1675, the General Court of Massachusetts Bay
began to pass declarations and laws in mid-October that limited Indian
movement and made it legal “to apprehend and secure” Indians who
wandered too close to Boston without English approval. Almost imme-
diately, Henry Lawton and John Leverdure, both of Boston, sailed the
ship Endeavor up the Maine coast to capture Indians. They traveled up
to Machias and Cape Sable, both well outside of the English claims to
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territory, and pretended to have goods to trade with the local Indians
not involved in the war. They took seventeen natives captive and
brought them back to Boston, where they were sold into slavery. Lawton
and Leverdure were eventually arrested and tried in 1677; Leverdure was
acquitted and Lawton fined £20. No doubt the delay in the trial, and the
lightness of the fines, had to do with English attitudes toward Indians
during this troubled time. Regardless, the trial occurred well after word
of the deed had reached the eastern Maine Wabanakis on the coast. By
then, the damage had already been done.36
The slaving expedition highlighted the troublesome nature of In-
dian-English relations in northern New England during the period.
Many Bostonians, and even settlers and traders along the coast of Maine,
minimized their interaction with the Wabanakis. Although some
traders, such as Thomas Gardiner, understood keenly the differences be-
tween Wabanaki groups and befriended many Indians, these men were
often ignored when discussions about Indian policy occurred in Boston.
Policymakers in Massachusetts Bay lacked nuance in their views toward
the Indians and failed to recognize the importance of diplomacy. At
times, Bostonians recognized that different Wabanakis held a range of
opinions on a variety of subjects, including war. But for the most part
throughout the colonial period, Boston officials rarely deviated from
certain goals: regulate all trade with the Indians, keep them away from
the French, and, after 1693, demand their subjection under the English
crown. Thus they remained constantly at odds with the Wabanakis and
even English settlers in Maine.37
The slaving expedition infuriated many Indians, including the hith-
erto peaceful Kennebecs and Penobscots. They had suffered through a
harsh winter, cut off from both their English supply of gunpowder,
which they needed for hunting, and from their food resources on the
coast. During the winter many Kennebecs and Penobscots became an-
gry, and although they continued to push for peace, stories of English
slavers running up and down the coast kidnapping peaceful Indians was
another thing entirely. By early summer of 1676, many Kennebecs and
Penobscots wanted to attack English settlements and property, while
other Indian groups, in the words of Hubbard, “were strangely dis-
persed, and dispirited, so as they from that Time began to separate one
from another, and every Nation of them to shift for themselves.”38
Despite the troublesome situation for the eastern Maine Wabanakis,
many Kennebecs and Penobscots maintained constant contact with the
English settlers who had returned to Pemaquid, and they often brought
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presents to show their good intentions and desire for peace. During the
spring of 1676, they redeemed a captive, a young English boy, as a ges-
ture of goodwill. But during the summer, when these Indians learned of
the slaving raid of Lawton and Leverdure, they traveled to Pemaquid and
demanded the English account for their actions. John Earthy and
Richard Oliver, leading traders at Pemaquid, knew nothing of the raids,
and doubted they actually happened, but they calmed the Indians, and
even persuaded them to meet with the still-warring Androscoggins to
broker a peace, one that they hoped could dovetail with the treaty signed
at Cocheco that month. These Wabanakis agreed to the idea, and a meet-
ing was arranged among some Androscoggins, the Kennebecs, and the
Penobscots at Taconic in August, but with sore feelings on both sides.39
Captain Sylvanus Davis negotiated for the English, and tensions be-
tween the Wabanaki pro- and anti-war factions began to strain the ne-
gotiations almost immediately. The Penobscot Madockawando “sate as
Chief” of the proceedings, and the Kennebec Assiminasqua spoke for
the Kennebecs and the Penobscots. Assiminasqua confronted Davis
about the Indian slavers and about the ultimatum that Captain Lake had
made about disarmament or death the previous autumn. Did friends
treat each other in this way? Davis acknowledged the injustice of the
slave traders, but asserted that the English lacked the authority to do
anything about it, as the transgression occurred outside of New Eng-
land’s territorial jurisdiction. Tarumkin, a man who headed the An-
droscoggin delegation after the recent death of Robin Hood, soon
moved the discussion to less contentious topics by stating that he and
the three Androscoggin sachems who had joined him—which included
Robin Hood’s son, Hope Hood—wanted peaceful relations with the
English. However, he admitted, many other Wabanakis to the west, pre-
sumably including other Androscoggins, Sacos, Kennebunks, and Pig-
wackets, still agitated for war, regardless of the recent treaty signed at
Cocheco. But he reasserted his commitment for peace, against the
wishes of these bellicose Indians, as did the eight other Androscoggins
present.40
The talk of peace only angered the Penobscot Madockawando, who
bypassed Assiminasqua as speaker and demanded to know why the Eng-
lish insisted on Wabanaki disarmament and refused to trade shot and
powder to the Indians. What would the English have us do, he asked,
starve during the winter, after all our corn was gone? Or should we travel
to Québec to get our goods from the French? Davis replied that he
would bring that problem up with Governor Leverett when he returned
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to Boston, but in the meantime the English could only permit the Indi-
ans to keep some arms to use for their hunt. With so many Indians in
western Maine still eager to fight, as Tarumkin had noted, the English
could not sell powder to the Kennebecs and Penobscots, for “what do we
but cut our own throats?”41 Davis, like many Englishmen of the time, re-
fused to differentiate between friendly and enemy Wabanakis. Regard-
less, Davis said, he had no right to make a decision on trading weapons;
only the governor and council in Boston could decide that. If the gov-
ernment wanted the Indians to wait ten years to get powder, he declared,
then the Indians would have to wait ten years to get powder.42 His words
infuriated the Kennebecs and the Penobscots, and the Androscoggins
were alarmed enough to rethink their position on peace. The talks broke
off almost immediately, on August 10.43
The breakdown of negotiations only mirrored events that were al-
ready put into motion elsewhere. During the talks, Wabanakis who were
uninterested in peace fell upon Falmouth. On August 9, they killed a cow
owned by Captain Anthony Brackett. They returned two days later, on
August 11, under the leadership of Simon, an Indian from the Pis-
cataqua region who had just been released from Cocheco’s prison with
the peace in July. They attacked Brackett’s farm, stole his weapons, killed
his son, and took the rest of the family captive.44 They then attacked
farm after farm on the outskirts of Falmouth, and by the end of the day
they had killed eleven men and killed or captured twenty-three women
and children.45
On August 13, the Kennebecs and the Penobscots fully joined the
war when they attacked the trading post of Richard Hammond, in a
probable attempt to gain supplies. No one was injured. These Wabanakis
then traveled down to Arrowsic, where they arrived on the morning of
August 14, and attacked the fortified trading post of Major Thomas
Clarke and Captain Thomas Lake. The Indians killed or captured sixty-
three people. Lake was caught and killed; Sylvanus Davis was wounded
but escaped; and Clarke fled with his life. The Indians looted the trading
post at Arrowsic, taking many thousands of pounds of merchandise.46
The war had now shifted decidedly eastward.
These raids demonstrated to the English that the Indians could over-
run them in Maine. Word of the attacks spread rapidly to English set-
tlers, many of whom abandoned their coastal settlements. Settlers in the
Sagadahoc region fled to Damariscove Island, and then, believing they
were still in danger, fled further to Monhegan Island. As they attempted
to build a temporary settlement, they saw smoke emanating from their
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burning villages on the mainland. They sent messengers to the more-
populated areas to the south for help, but when no help came after three
weeks, they took as many provisions as they could and sailed for Pis-
cataqua, Salem, and Boston. Others had fled to Jewell Island, only to be
attacked there by a group of Kennebecs, but they were eventually res-
cued by passing fishermen. No English settlements northeast of Black
Point now remained.47
If any Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and Penobscots still questioned
their involvement in the war, news of events happening simultaneously
in New Hampshire would have quelled any doubts. Because the war in
southern New England was now over (Metacom, or King Philip, was
shot to death in August 1676), the English could turn their full attention
to the war in the north. One hundred and thirty English militiamen and
thirty Natick Indian warriors were sent to Cocheco, all placed under the
general command of Major Richard Waldron. There, roughly four hun-
dred Indians had come together to reinvigorate the peace talks. About
half were Pennacooks from New Hampshire, who had remained loyal to
the English through their neutrality, but many others were refugees from
the southern New England Nipmucks, Wampanoags, and Narragansetts,
Indians who had recently stopped fighting with the collapse of King
Philip’s coalition. Emotions ran high. Men on both sides, including Ma-
jor Waldron, recognized enemy warriors from past battles, and the Eng-
lish were eager to punish King Philip’s warriors. Under orders from
Boston, Waldron laid a trap for them on September 7, 1676. He brought
the Indians together under a flag of truce, and then surrounded them
with his soldiers (some of whom had misgivings about the order). All of
the two hundred or so Pennacooks under the sachem Wanalancet,
whom the English knew were innocent of depredations against English
villages, were released, and the rest were deemed enemies of New Eng-
land. Ten of them were immediately sent to Boston and executed. The
rest were eventually sold into slavery.48 Waldron and the government in
Boston believed he had fulfilled the government’s orders, but the Penna-
cooks were shaken by Waldron’s act.49
With this blow the war reached a new phase, as it galvanized Indian
opposition like never before. As the Kennebecs and Penobscots had re-
cently joined the war, the Wabanakis throughout Maine finally pre-
sented a united front against the English. Now, Pigwackets, Kennebunks,
Sacos, Androscoggins, Kennebecs, and Penobscots all took part in the vi-
olence, and many of the New Hampshire Pennacooks felt alienated, at
the least, from their English allies. The homogenizing vision of Massa-
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chusetts Bay officials had created the pan-Wabanaki enemy it had always
believed existed.
Although a vast majority of Wabanakis began to fight the English,
they did not coordinate their attacks on English settlements. Had they
coalesced into larger groups, they might have paradoxically given the
English a chance to defend themselves in Maine. But the Wabanakis con-
tinued to fight the English within small groups, only occasionally raid-
ing with more than twenty warriors at a time. They continued to attack
outlying farms and poorly defended villages, never opting for full as-
saults against English soldiers but only engaging at times they deemed
opportune. This new phase of the war pitted relatively coalesced English
forces against numerous, tiny, highly mobile groups of extremely skilled
Wabanaki warriors who attacked in uncoordinated, minimally planned,
minimally strategized, relatively spontaneous raids. 
With the frontier so exposed, with the Wabanakis dispersed in such a
way as to deny the English any substantial targets (without actually go-
ing deep into Indian territory to Wabanaki villages, and even then with
only the possibility of finding and destroying tiny groups of Wabanaki
warriors), the Wabanakis had ample opportunity to wreak havoc on
English villages. They took advantage of those opportunities, suffered
minimal casualties, did enormous damage to English settlements, and
inched closer and closer to removing all English settlers from Maine by
the fall of 1676. When those settlers saw or heard of the destruction, they
panicked, and hundreds began to flee further down the coast. With their
small, unpredictable fighting forces, the Wabanakis made numerous
raids that individually amounted only to superficial wounds but when
combined quickly bled English Maine to death.
As word of Waldron’s act in Cocheco traveled through Wabanakia,
various Indian groups began to work toward eradicating the English
presence in Maine, and even beyond. Black Point was now the eastern-
most point of English settlement, which made it an obvious target. It
came under attack, on October 12, 1676, by forces led by an Indian
named Mogg Hegon, an important sachem-diplomat who seemed to
have ties with the Sacos, the Androscoggins, the Kennebecs, and even the
English at different times. The village fell the same day.50
The attack on Black Point occurred under the nose of Captain
William Hathorne, who had been sent out after the events at Cocheco
with a contingent of Massachusetts militiamen and friendly Natick Indi-
ans to engage the Indians of Maine. He and his men marched to Fal-
mouth, but succeeded in doing little else. The hostile Wabanakis in the
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area of southwestern Maine refused to engage his unit, and instead made
small raids nearby that Hathorne’s troops were powerless to stop, such as
at Black Point.51 The only success that Hathorne could claim was the
capture of one Pigwacket sachem, who told him of thirty or forty Ken-
nebecs who fought from a Pigwacket base at Ossippee. They had twenty
captured Englishmen there. “[W]ee found him in many lyes,” Hathorne
insisted, and he handed the Pigwacket over to a group of “Cochecho In-
dians,” or Pennacooks, to torture and execute.52 In his report to his supe-
riors, Hathorne concluded that it was difficult to engage the Indians in
war. There were too many rivers and the land was “soe much broken”
that the Indians simply receded into the forest. Many of the English set-
tlers in Maine, he continued, wanted to abandon the place, kill their cat-
tle, and cut their corn, but Hathorne ordered them to stay as he did not
think it good “for the Interest of the Country.” He returned to Massa-
chusetts Bay with very little to show for his efforts.53
One of the “many lyes” Hathorne believed he had been told regarded
French involvement in the war, a persistent rumor that reinforced Eng-
lish homogenization of the Indians in Maine. The sachem had denied
the rumor, but Hathorne did not believe him, and he was not the only
one. He wrote that the inhabitants throughout coastal Maine had told
him of French support from the government of the nearby colony of
Québec. Many English settlers along the coast simply took that as self-
evident, and the topic burned in English minds throughout the war.
New Englanders were obsessed with the French, asserting that they
propagated a corrupt papist religion, encouraged underhanded politics,
and traded arms and ammunition with the Indians. The fact that they
could only glimpse French involvement in Maine heightened English
anxiety.54
There is no evidence of involvement by the French government in
King Philip’s War. In fact, the French government took particular care to
foster good relations with the English during this period. In a mémoire
to his government in Québec, Louis XIV urged them to build up trade
and commercial links with New England in the hopes of solidifying the
growth of his much smaller colony. The French crown hoped that trade
with the English would not only enhance the successful French fishing
industry but would also stimulate French shipping, as France wanted to
import timber from New England in exchange for wine and eau de vie.55
The governor-general of New France, the Comte de Frontenac, met with
many of the Wabanaki refugees who fled the fighting in Maine to the Je-
suit mission of Sillery, and told them that they were welcomed to stay in
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the area on the condition that they would not return to fight the Eng-
lish.56 The French government wanted little to do with this Anglo-In-
dian war.57
But other, more independently minded Frenchmen disagreed with
Louis’s policy. Numerous French traders might have attempted to do
their best to support the Wabanaki cause. Many of these men, unlike
some of their English counterparts, negotiated deftly with Indians, and
some even lived among them. The most prominent French trader in the
area of present-day Maine, Jean-Vincent d’Abbadie, Baron de Saint-
Castin, lived among the Penobscots for decades, and eventually married
the daughter of the head sachem Madockawando.58 These coureurs de
bois forged ties with Indian communities that most Englishmen failed to
achieve. They adapted to the protocols of Indian reciprocity within
trade, understanding that the Indians viewed trade relations not as sim-
ple contractual exchanges but as mutually beneficial relations between
kin—literally with Saint-Castin, metaphorically with other French
traders. Therefore, they not only stood to gain from supplying the Wa-
banakis with the materials the Indians could no longer get from the Eng-
lish, but they also had obligations within Wabanaki society that de-
manded proper reciprocal relations between kin. Shrewd French traders
like Saint-Castin merged these two dimensions of trade to profit eco-
nomically and socially, building both material and social capital. 
So it is no surprise that Francis Card, a settler on the Kennebec River
who was captured with his family by the Kennebecs and Penobscots in
August 1676, reported to Boston officials after his escape that he had
overheard “a french man tell the Idenes that casten was very thankful to
them for what they had don and tould them that he and his men would
help them in the spring and that he would se for pouder this winter.”59
Or, even more pointedly, that Joshua Scottow, in charge of the garrison
at Black Point in 1676, reported that he heard an English settler, hidden
in the woods to escape an Indian attack, had seen among the seventy or
eighty Indians “two or three Frenchmen with them, one who leads being
brave with blue, black & yellow ribbons on his knee, a hat buckled with a
silver buckle, brave belt, &c. & heard him inquire in French by an Indian
interpreter who spoke very good English of the captives, whether it were
difficult to take Richmond Island & Blackpoint, of the number of our
men, & that their design is to carry all before as they have done along the
Eastern shore.”60 Clearly, some French individuals helped the Wabanakis
during the war.
That support, although minimal, was enough for rumors to take
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hold in northern New England. Many Wabanakis recognized the impor-
tance of disinformation, and did their best to spread it, if it helped their
cause. They understood that settlers and government officials in New
England feared French involvement, and they did not disabuse the Eng-
lish of that possibility. Card went on to report that during his captivity at
Pemaquid, four Indian women arrived from Québec and told the Wa-
banakis in Maine that “the gouerner of canedy did thank them for what
they had don and towld them that they would help them with 100: men
and amunesion….” Mogg Hegon also bragged to Card that he was soon
off to Canada to get Governor-General Frontenac’s support.61
When false rumors like these were added to the occasional sighting
of a Frenchman on the frontier and the English predisposition to believe
any allegation of French involvement, the result was widespread panic.
Thomas Gardiner, so friendly with Penobscots and Kennebecs prior to
the war, was almost immediately accused of trading with the enemy—al-
ready both French and Indian—when the war broke out. He was forced
to travel to Boston to explain his actions, and he was eventually acquit-
ted.62 The council in Boston wrote a letter to the Secretary of State in
London in April 1676, which charged that Jesuits and other Frenchmen
were helping the Indians fight against them.63 Major Brian Pendleton,
commander at Winter Harbor, displayed an acute case of English anxi-
ety over French involvement in his description of the 1676 attack on
Black Point. Although an eyewitness to the attack had seen two or three
Frenchmen among the seventy or eighty Indians, Pendleton, who was
not at Black Point, wrote in a letter to the governor and council that five
hundred Indians and three hundred Frenchmen attacked the garrison,
and an additional one hundred Indians were attacking farms in the area.
He and his men used that information to justify abandoning their post
at Winter Harbor.64 Rumors played a key role in disorienting the English
on the Maine frontier, and the fear of a unified enemy aided by the du-
plicitous French only enhanced the Wabanakis’ ability to erase the Eng-
lish from more of the coast. By 1676, only Wells, York, and Kittery re-
mained as English settlements in Maine, and isolated farms around
Wells came under Wabanaki attack not long after.65
Strangely, with the victory at Black Point and the English on the
brink of being swept from Maine, Mogg attempted to take the war into a
new direction in early November 1676, by meeting with Governor John
Leverett in Boston to broker a peace. This decision must have been un-
popular for many Wabanakis, especially the Sacos and Androscoggins,
who may have known nothing about it at all. Numerous Sacos and An-
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droscoggins, whose villages were closest to the remaining English settle-
ments, were probably eager to eradicate English settlement from at least
the area east of the Piscataqua River—a natural boundary not only be-
tween Maine and New Hampshire, but also between the warring eastern
Wabanakis and the neutral Pennacooks. But Mogg was designated to
make peace with the English by Madockawando, the Penobscot sachem.
His Penobscots were farthest from the English settlements, and main-
tained the best relations with English traders before the war. Saint-
Castin, the French trader, lived among the Penobscots at Pentagouët,
and his profitable enterprises—which did much to maintain the general
wealth of the Penobscots as a whole—was certainly hurt by the war, as
his main trading partners were English. Although this can only be spec-
ulated, it seems that Madockawando might have pushed for peace, for it
benefited his Penobscots the most.66
Governor Leverett eagerly wanted a peace as well. However, he did
not understand the subtleties of Wabanaki diplomacy and was arrogant
about how he negotiated. He drew up articles that were so favorable to
the English that Mogg must have realized that the governor refused to
compromise—which also must have shocked him, considering the state
of English settlements on the Maine frontier. The peace that Mogg
signed on November 6, 1676, was filled with items that most Wabanakis
would reject, and some provisions were impossible for the Indians to
fulfill. Its major points stipulated that Madockawando would first con-
vince all the Wabanakis to stop hostilities against the English, and that
he and his allies would declare war on any Indians that continued them.
Second, the Wabanakis would return all English captives, ships, and
goods, including arms and artillery, that they took from the English, and
the Indians would compensate the English for all injuries, losses, dam-
ages to houses, cattle, and estates, either immediately or in yearly fees
paid to the government of Massachusetts Bay—if the council even ap-
proved that expediency. Third, the English would begin to supply the In-
dians with powder, firearms, ammunition, and other necessary supplies,
but the Wabanakis could only trade for guns and ammunition with
traders approved by the governor and council. And finally, as a gesture of
Indian goodwill, Mogg was to make himself a prisoner of the English
until all of these treaty stipulations were met. No doubt fearing that his
refusal might lead to his immediate incarceration, Mogg signed the
peace on November 6, 1676, with absolutely no intention of keeping his
word.67 Once he was released to contact numerous Indians on the coast
to inform them of the treaty, he fled, and the peace was stillborn.68
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It did not take officials in Boston long to realize that Mogg and
Madockawando had no intention of abiding by the treaty. On January
29, 1677, the council ordered Major Waldron to lead a contingent of 150
English militiamen and fifty Natick Indians to Maine and either destroy
the Wabanakis or gain a lasting peace.69 This expedition proved to be al-
most as inconclusive as Hathorne’s. Waldron met and negotiated with
Simon to redeem English captives on the coast at Maquoit (near
Brunswick) on February 18. Simon promised to return them a day after
the goods were handed to the Indians. Waldron wanted to negotiate di-
rectly with Squando, who remained nearby. Squando agreed, but on the
condition that they meet alone, in a canoe, in the bay—Waldron’s repu-
tation had preceded him. Waldron refused, stating that “‘he would not
venture himself in your Leakie canoo, and that if he had no more to say,
the Treaty was ended.’” Squando professed himself eager for peace talks,
however, and still agreed to return captives the next morning. But the
Indians (most likely Sacos and Androscoggins) came late the next day,
without the captives, some miles upriver from the English. They pro-
ceeded to burn an abandoned house and taunted English scouting par-
ties, goading them to attack. The truce was broken, fighting began, and
several Indians were wounded. The English again raised the white flag,
to enquire about the captives, and head scout John Paine parleyed with
Simon. Simon explained that a contingent of Wabanakis was uninter-
ested in Squando’s attempts at peace, and had decided on their own to
attack and burn the settler’s home. He promised to bring the captives the
next day, as Squando had sent away for them. He finished the parley by
accusing the English of initiating the fight with the Indians, and de-
manding compensation for the two wounded men.70
The rest of Waldron’s expedition only exacerbated the tension and
violence. Waldron waited one more day for Simon to bring the captives,
and when they failed to arrive he and his men traveled up the coast to
Arrowsic Island, wandering in the area for three days in the snow with-
out seeing an Indian. On February 26, Waldron and sixty of his men
traveled farther up the coast toward the mouth of the Penobscot River,
leaving the rest of his men under Captain Sylvanus Davis on Arrowsic
Island to build a garrison.71 During the trip, they stopped at Pemaquid,
parleying with Indians who had taken over Thomas Gardiner’s trading
post. The group included the Penobscot sachem Mattahando, who in-
sisted that they had refused to join Madockawando and his men against
the English. Three other sachems from the group told Waldron of their
intentions for peace. Waldron did not believe them, but he wanted to ne-
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gotiate for any English captives they had before attacking them. He
struck a bargain of a certain amount of goods per captive, including al-
cohol, and the Penobscots gave him the three they had. He distributed
the alcohol first, and he promised to bring the remaining items in the af-
ternoon. 
While they drank, Waldron demanded that the Indians hand over
those responsible for any depredations against the English. Alarmed, the
sachems stated that none were there. Only the young warriors were re-
sponsible, they told Waldron, and they were increasingly difficult to con-
trol. Under a flag of truce, Waldron brought the Indians some of the ran-
som goods in the afternoon, but soon accused the Indians of secretly
preparing to kill Waldron and his soldiers. The English then attacked,
killing seven Indians, including Mattahando. Waldron also took four
prisoners, including the Penobscot sachem Megunaway, and Madock-
awando’s sister. He and his men looted the store of goods at Pemaquid,
then executed Megunaway. Upon returning to Boston, Waldron and his
men hoped that this attack had “scattered and broken” the Wabanakis,
and that the Indians would end their depredations on settlers in the
area.72 That statement alone highlights just how little Waldron under-
stood the situation in Maine.
Although officials in Massachusetts Bay and settlers in northern New
England hoped Waldron was correct, the spring of 1677 brought more
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Map of English settlements in Maine in the 1670s. Most of these settlements
were destroyed by the Wabanakis during King Philip’s War. Courtesy of the au-
thor. 
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war. Truth and rumor of Waldron’s expedition into Maine the previous
winter would have circulated along the coast, and, at the very least, many
Penobscots would have wanted to retaliate for the deaths of Mattahando
and Megunaway, among others. A group of Wabanakis, probably local
Kennebecs and Penobscots, attacked the fledgling garrison on Arrowsic
Island, while small groups of western Maine Wabanakis led by Simon at-
tacked the settlements of York and Wells. The Indians also began to make
raids in New Hampshire, against farms within miles of Portsmouth,
killing six.73 Boston received a petition from the village of York, pleading
for reinforcements.74
Obviously the government of Massachusetts Bay recognized that the
war would continue, and with the first signs of spring in New England
they sent envoys to Albany, New York, to convince the Mohawks to fight
against the Wabanakis. The Mohawks had played an important role in
New England’s destruction of King Philip’s coalition.75 They had antago-
nized the Wabanakis for decades before King Philip’s War. Now, Massa-
chusetts Bay officials wanted the Mohawks to help them solve the Wa-
banaki problems to the northeast. The Mohawks received the diplomats
kindly, and stated they would send a raiding party eastward, but that
they were unable to send a large assault force for some time.76 This small
contingent soon attacked a group of Pennacooks, killing several of them,
including one of their sachems, Blind Will.77 That was the extent of Mo-
hawk involvement in the northern front of King Philip’s War.
Regardless of how little the Mohawks did on the Maine frontier, the
fact that the English were talking with them made an enormous impres-
sion on Wabanakia. Many Wabanakis were terrified of the Mohawks be-
cause they still remembered the suffering they received at Mohawk
hands during the 1660s. Rumors of impending Mohawk attacks began to
circulate around northern New England in 1677; few Wabanakis wanted
to contemplate a war with both the English and the Mohawks at the
same time.78 Some began to fear that these Mohawk-English negotia-
tions proved that, in the words of historian Emerson Baker, “the English
planned to exterminate them.”79 Other Wabanakis began to betray their
skittishness. When a Wabanaki raiding party captured a delegation of
pro-English Indians, the party carried the captives twenty miles inland,
set them free, and retreated, for they feared that Mohawks might be in
the area.80
But rumors of Mohawk involvement did not stop Wabanakis from
making their raids on English settlements. On May 16, 1677, they again
attacked the garrison at Black Point, which had been reinvested by the
English after losing it to Mogg in 1676. Mogg again led a group of war-
riors (most likely Kennebecs and Penobscots), but was killed during the
three-day siege, and the English rebuffed the attack. The Indians fol-
lowed this raid with others on York on May 19, Wells on May 23, and
Hampton, New Hampshire, on June 13. Nine Englishmen were killed
during these raids. When the English counterattacked with a contingent
under the command of Captain Benjamin Swett, they suffered their
worst defeat of the war, when twenty Natick Indians and forty of the
English soldiers, including Swett himself, were killed in an ambush just
outside Black Point. The Wabanakis even began to attack English sea-
men by passing themselves off as fishermen or forcing English crews to
sail up to unsuspecting trawlers. By July 15, 1677, news was circulating
in the fishing towns of Marblehead and Salem that twenty fishing
ketches had been taken by Indians, with crews of five or six men each.
With their small, limited raiding, the Wabanakis dominated all of Maine
and its coast.81
But peace was much closer than that incident suggests. It seems ap-
propriate that people unaffiliated with either Massachusetts Bay or the
Wabanakis would initiate peace in the region. Governor Edmond An-
dros of the colony of New York, in a move to reassert the Duke of York’s
claims to the area of Sagadahoc, sent four ships and one hundred men
under Lt. Anthony Brockholst to Pemaquid. Brockholst brought a mes-
sage of peace to the Wabanakis, and numerous Wabanakis across Maine
were eager to hear him out. On July 17, 1677, eight sachems signed a
peace agreement. For the time being, all of the Saco and Kennebec Indi-
ans put themselves under the leadership of Kennebec sachem Moxes,
who led the proceedings. The Sacos, in particular, seemed open for
peace, and a majority of them abandoned their sachem, Squando, who
fled to Canada. The Androscoggins, Moxes warned the English, were still
for war, and were not at the parley. The Wabanakis returned thirty-five
English captives to Brockholst.82
New York’s interest in Maine made officials in Massachusetts Bay
wary. They hoped to maintain a clear and unfettered jurisdiction over
the area, and this intrusion certainly countered their claims. They con-
tacted Brockholst before the parley, outlining the demands they believed
he should make to the Indians. They insisted that the Wabanakis stop
raiding English settlements, return all captives and all fishing ketches, re-
strict their movements to the west of Casco Bay, and avoid the English
settlements. Brockholst told the Indians of Massachusetts Bay’s de-
mands, except for the fishing ketches, which he believed was too oner-
ous, and “was like to spoyle all wee had done, & make a new breach.” He
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thought that authorities in Massachusetts Bay made these demands be-
cause they “had no desire to bee concerned in the Peace, proposing so
difficult Termes.” 
Brokholst later complained to Boston officials that “yor owne peo-
ple” told the Indians of the demand for the ketches, and it angered
“Some of the looser Indyans” so much that they threatened to attack the
English contingent and take the Indian captives they had by force. These
Wabanakis eventually acquiesced to all of Massachusetts Bay’s demands,
but the final treaty ratified in August only stipulated that the Indians
would stop fighting the English and return all English captives.
Squando, chastised by his fellow villagers, returned in August to join in
ratifying the treaty, which was attended by a larger Wabanaki coalition
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The war in Massachusetts proper was more devastating for native groups there
than for English colonists, and the war in this southern theatre ended in August
1676 upon King Philip’s death. The opposite was true in the District of Maine,
as English settlements were nearly wiped out and the war continued until 1678.
From Henry E. Chambers, A Higher History of the United States (New York and
New Orleans: University Publishing Company, 1898), p. 144.
that included these Indians with Penobscots under Madockawando and
a majority of Pigwacket and Androscoggin sachems.83
Massachusetts Bay officials were left on the outside looking in. They
eventually had no say over the August 1677 treaty, and they refused to
sign it anyway, as doing so would legitimize the Duke of York’s claims to
the region. However, they recognized the difficulty of maintaining any
authority in Maine without peace, so Massachusetts Bay officials pushed
for their own diplomatic negotiations with the Wabanakis. The two sides
eventually came to terms on April 12, 1678. The Wabanakis agreed to re-
lease all English captives, and they gained one peck of corn for every set-
tlement household in Maine. The English settlers were then allowed to
go back to their homes. War in Maine was over, for the time being.84
Even after the peace treaties of 1677 and 1678, Wabanakis continued
to kill cattle, attack fishing boats, and burn down settlers’ homes in the
Maine borderlands.85 Not all Wabanakis took part in the violence, but
many Indians remained incensed at how Massachusetts Bay authorities
had dealt with them. The colony’s hard, unequivocal posture, so preva-
lent throughout the war, homogenized the complicated interests and
constituencies among the Wabanakis, transforming a complex situation
that demanded deft diplomacy into a rigid one that encouraged more vi-
olence. Many on both sides retained their anger, even years after the war.
In 1699, Cotton Mather wrote that the peace in 1678 “Left a Body of In-
dians, not only with Horrible Murders Unrevenged, but also in the pos-
session of no little part of the Countrey, with circumstances which the
English might think not very Honourable.”86 Numerous Wabanakis,
such as the Kennebec sachem Deogenes Madoasquarbet, excoriated
Richard Waldron for his wartime acts, complaining immediately after
the war that “Major Waldin have bin the cause of killing all that have bin
kiled this sommer.”87 The Indians would not forget Waldron’s duplicity
at Cocheco, or his high-handedness on the Maine coast. When the two
groups moved again toward war in 1689, the Wabanakis made a point of
attacking Waldron’s garrison first. Once inside, they forced Waldron
from his bed, sat him at his dining room table, tortured him, then killed
him.88 The impact of the violence of the 1670s clearly lingered in the
minds of these Indians.
One wonders what new readings of violence during King Philip’s
War could come out of this re-examination of its theater in Maine. Mas-
sachusetts Bay officials seemed to create enemies out of peaceful peoples
in the north because of the existential threat that the colony faced from
King Philip in the south. Because it was an extreme social experience, the
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war (like all colonial conflicts in the Northeast) tended toward homoge-
nization at social, cultural, and even psychological levels in order for
combatants to justify and rationalize self-preservation. The English
would not (and mostly likely could not) break out of that dynamic of
homogenization of an Indian enemy in Maine because of the level of
devastation wrought by the Narragansetts, Naticks, and Wampanoags.
But their relative success against those Indians also no doubt convinced
the English of the possibility and justice of a victory against the Wa-
banakis. Many English and Indian men, women, and children would
suffer from that dynamic of violence.89
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